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364 U.S. 339 (1960)
Negro petitioners alleged they were disfranchised by an Alabama
statute1 redefining the boundaries of Tuskegee.2 This alteration changed the
shape of the city from a rectangle to a twenty-eight sided figure,3 and as a
result all but four or five Negro voters were excluded from the city elections.
The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it had no
authority to declare the act invalid, regardless of legislative motive or the
statute's actual effect. 4 The court of appeals affirmed this dismissal, declar-
ing that "in absence of racial or class discrimination appearing on the face
of the statute, it could not be held invalid as violative of the fourteenth
amendment."5 The opinion states that the constitutionality of the establish-
ment of municipal boundaries or voting districts constitutes a "political ques-
tion,"6 and thus is not subject to judicial review.
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the suit,7 holding that if
petitioners could prove the statute effectively discriminated against Negro
voters, they would establish a violation of their right to vote as guaranteed
by the fifteenth amendment. A concurring opinion suggests that the act
violated only the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.
When the Supreme Court decides the nature of a question is political,
it will not adjudicate the dispute; the Court leaves to the political depart-
ments of the government (the executive and legislative) the task of formu-
lating by act or word the proper decision to be applied.8 Among the various
theories advanced to explain the "political question" doctrine, the most
plausible include the concept of separation of powers 9 and the Court's
I Ala. Acts 1957, No. 140.
2 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
3 Id. at 348 (diagram).
4 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
1 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
6 Id. at 593, "The enactment by a state legislature of statute creating, enlarging,
diminishing or abolishing a municipal corporation is a political function. It is a govern-
mental act."
7 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra note 2.
8 See Field, "The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts," 8 Minn.
L. Rev. 485 (1924); Post, The Supreme Court and Political Questions (1936).
9 E.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (purported ratification of a constitu-
tional amendment); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (suit brought by a
state to test its political and sovereign rights).
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natural apprehension of the practical consequences that would follow from
an adjudication of such a dispute.10
A potential "political question" arises when a legislature alters a muni-
cipality's boundary. The general rule is that "the power of increase and
dimunition of municipal territory is plenary, inherent and discretionary in
the legislature."" However, the validity of such state action is limited by a
determination that the individual interests involved outweigh the state's
interests in the context of a given case.' 2 This limitation is applied in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot where the Court states, "... . the conclusion urged by
respondents would sanction the achievement by a State of any impairment
of voting rights whatever, so long as it was cloaked in the garb of the re-
alignment of political subdivisions."' 3
The Gomillion opinion is consistent with the recent trend of the Court's
decisions. Where racial discrimination results from a political function, the
judiciary will exercise its power to review, thus avoiding application of the
"political question" doctrine. This approach is prevalent in the area of
purposeful deprivation of Negro voting rights resulting from ingenious state
methods.
The first of these devious state actions ruled unconstitutional involved
the so-called "grandfather clause."'1 4 When the state subsequently passed
another statute aimed at depriving Negroes of the right to vote, it was
struck down (although the statute was non-discriminatory on its face), the
Court saying, "the Fifteenth Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as
simple minded modes of discrimination."' 5 In the same spirit, the Court
held unconstitutional the white primary laws and comparable schemes
to accomplish the same end.'6 The Court has also avoided the "political
question" in cases involving the inequitable administration of suffrage
statutes.1
7
10 E.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866). The Court refused
to enjoin the President from applying the Reconstruction Acts and stated, "if the
President refuses obedience, it is needless to observe that the Court is without power
to enforce its processes." Other theories for the "political question" doctrine are
lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination and necessity for uniformity
and finality in certain political actions, e.g., foreign relations.
"L See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (dictum); 1
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 393 (8th ed. 1927).
12 "Concessions of power to municipal corporations are of high importance; but
they are not contracts, and consequently, are subject to legislative control without
limitation, unless the legislature oversteps the limits of the Constitution." Mount
Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 533 (1879).
13 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra note 2, at 342.
14 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
15 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
16 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), "The objection that the subject matter
of the suit is political is little more than a play on words." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
17 Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933. Alabama
"Boswell Amendment" gave county registrars complete discretion in administering
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A problem closely related to the Negro voting cases involves the dilution
of voting strength caused either by deliberate state action' 8 or legislative
inaction in failing to reapportion electoral units.19 Georgia's "county-unit"
system exemplifies this unequal treatment of electors; ignoring the system's
inequality to voters in urban areas, the Court held that "the Federal courts
consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing political
issues arising from a State's geographical distribution of electoral strength
among its political subdivisions. '20 An extremely persuasive dissent factually
demonstrates that the effect of the unit method is particularly harsh on
Negro voters, as well as discriminatory against voters in urban areas.21
A similar rationale prevails in cases involving non-racial gerrymandering
practices resulting from legislative inaction (the more common method of
diluting voting strength). In Colegrove v. Green,22 the leading case on the
subject, Illinois voters attacked the disparity of population in the state's
congressional districts as in violation of article I of the Constitution and
the fourteenth amendment. Petitioners' suit was dismissed on the ground that
the issue presented was "of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not
meet for judicial determination. '23 Subsequent cases have relied on the
Colegrove decision in dismissing suits attempting to remedy the gerrymander-
ing problem.
2 4
One could conclude that the judicial self-restraint present in both these
adjudications demonstrates the Court's attitude that establishing electoral
units involves a "political question" even when discrimination is shown.
This unfavorable conclusion is, in part, rectified in Gornillion v. Lightfoot25
The Court in Gomillion looks beyond the "political question" and examines
the racial effect of the legislation. This is noteworthy since the Court refused
to undertake this evaluation in the "county-unit" case,26 and consequently
registration requirements (e.g., understand and explain any article of the federal consti-
tution). The amendment was found in violation of the fifteenth amendment both in
objective as well as manner of administration. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17
(1960).
18 E.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 34-3212 to -3218 (1936).
19 For a general discussion see Lewis, "Legislative Apportionment and the Federal
Courts," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1957).
20 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1949).
21 Id. at 27, "Plaintiffs are registered voters in Georgia's most populous county
-Fulton County ... They show that a vote in one county will be worth over 120
times each of their votes ... in 45 counties a vote will be given twenty times the weight
of each of their votes ... Population figures show there is a heavy Negro popula-
tion in the large cities. There is testimony in the record that only in those areas have
Negroes been able to vote in important numbers."
22 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1945).
23 Id. at 552.
24 Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957) (Oklahoma legislative districts); Remmey
v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952) (Pennsylvania legislative districts); Colegrove v. Barret,
330 U.S. 804 (1947) (Illinois legislative districts); Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S.
675 (1946) (Georgia county-unit system).
25 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra note 2.
26 South v. Peters, supra note 20.
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arrived at a contrary decision. This racial examination and subsequent hold-
ing in Gornillion is consistent with the present Court's attitude toward
abolishing racial discrimination.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot2 7 attempts to differentiate its decision from Cole-
grove v. Green2 8 in two ways. The first ground is that the Colegrove problem
involves legislative inaction which diluted the strength of petitioner's vote
while the Tuskegee boundary act was "affirmative legislative action depriving
Negroes of their vote and consequent advantages that the ballot affords.12 9
The second basis for differentiating the two cases is that "where a legislature
singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special discri-
minatory treatment," a constitutional guarantee is violated, whereas in
Colegrove in certain areas, the general voting public were the parties subjected
to the gerrymandering discrimination. 0
The Court's distinction in Gomillion between legislative action and in-
action is valid only to the extent that courts are more prone to set aside
unconstitutional legislation than they are to correct the results of legislative
inaction. But this reasoning is weak because the end result (discriminatory
practices) is the vital element for the Court to examine, and the means to
the discrimination is only of secondary importance. It is significant that
the Court has not distinguished inaction from action in other cases of
voting rights.31
The Court's second distinction between the two cases is also unpersua-
sive. It is true that Negro voters are discriminated against by the Alabama
act, while in Illinois all citizens in gerrymandered electoral units suffered the
discrimination. However, the distinction goes no further since there are
constitutional bases for giving both electoral groups a judicial remedy. The
general voting public's rights to equal congressional representation can be
drawn from article I, and the privileges and immunities and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Negro voters can rely on the fourteenth
amendment to protect their suffrage rights in local elections. Again, the fact
that voting discrimination exists should be persuasive.
There are several distinctions between Gomillion and Colegrove that
the Court did not discuss.32 A problem in non-racial gerrymandering cases
involves the efficacy of judicial remedies; the present problem involves the
selection of a decree appropriate to remedy the situation once the Court has
taken jurisdiction and has determined that a constitutional right is violated.
The Supreme Court's function is not to determine state congressional dis-
tricts, but to review and ascertain whether the state has been "reasonable"
in establishing representative voting districts. The answer is simple; the
Court should return the task of apportionment to the states and grant review
if the state fails to meet the "reasonable" test. In Gomillion this difficulty
27 Gomillon v. Lightfoot, supra note 2.
28 Colegrove v. Green, supra note 2.
29 Gomilion v. Lightfoot, supra note 2, at 346.
30 Ibid.
31 E.g., Smith v. Allwright, supra note 16; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
32 Supra note 19.
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does not exist. When the Court rules the boundary act unconstitutional, the
boundaries of Tuskegee revert to their former state.
There is a somewhat more persuasive distinction between the Gomillion
and Colegrove problems. It is relatively easy for the Court to review state
enactments deliberately depriving Negroes of the right to vote, but in a
Colegrove situation the court by accepting jurisdiction may invite excessive
litigation. In almost every state there is a certain degree of malapportion-
ment. Should the Court venture into this "political thicket"? While it is
conceded that abandonment of Colegrove may add to the Court's burden,
the desirability of eliminating such gerrymandering from our democratic
process is great enough to overcome this objection.
Another distinguishing fact in the two cases is the problem of legisla-
tive responsibility involved in apportioning voting districts. Legislatures in
theory are responsive to the desires of the electorate, and if inequality
exists, the electorate should remedy it. This rationale is unrealistic because
of the inherent nature of our political structure that rural areas and their
representatives generally have the dominant position in the state governing
bodies and are unwilling to give up their power position by reapportioning
in favor of urban areas. 33 These legislators feel that they should be com-
pensated with greater voting strength because of the nature of city politics
with its vast facilities to reach more voters. 34 Also, they want to protect the
power of conservatives which would be sharply curtailed if they gave urban
areas their just voting power. Since the malapportioned districts cannot get
satisfaction from their state legislatures, they can turn only to the courts or
Congress for relief. Congress can scarcely affect the configuration of muni-
cipal boundary lines and thus the Court could give enormous impetus in
solving this acute problem of unequal representation. 35
Gomillion v. Lightoot36 could be the Court's initial step in eliminating
these discriminatory practices. The Court is not reluctant to review Negro
33 Stout, "The Next Election is Already Rigged," Harpers (Nov., 1959); Christ-
man, "How Much Will Your Vote Count," Nation 333-7 (1959). There are three
ways to gerrymander. (1) Disproportionate populations in setting districts, (2) create
districts equal in population, but manipulate boundaries to give one party an advantage,
(3) ignore population changes, and refuse to redistrict. This deprives growing cities
and urban areas equitable representation. See also supra note 19, at 1059-66.
34 E.g., Congressman James B. Utt of California's Twenty-eighth District represents
1,007,140 constituents while John B. Bennet, from Michigan's Twelfth Congressional
District represents 175,968 persons. See Lewis, "On the Trail of the Fierce Gerry-
mander," N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1961 (magazine), p. 17.
35 Christman, supra note 33. The malapportionment problem is summed up in
the following manner. "A minority of voters elects a majority of the membership of
every state legislature in the nation. Since state legislators shape the Congressional
districts, the House of Representatives is dominated by rural and small town elements.
The question that is involved is not who is to control Congress and pass legislation.
The crux of the problem: is America going to uphold the classic democratic ideal of
one man, one vote, Or will the vote of the American who happens to live in a city
or suburb continue to count for less because of his place of residence?"
36 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra note 2.
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discrimination in the establishment of electoral units, and it would be desir-
able if the same attitude is shown toward non-racial malapportionment
cases. The Court presently may be re-examining the Colegrove problem,
3 7
If Gomillion v. Lightfoot 38 is any indication of the Supreme Court's mood,
it will find these state voting practices in conflict with the Constitution.
In a number of decisions in the civil rights area, the Supreme Court
states their prerogative to examine the "legislative purpose" of a disputed
act,39 but Gomillion v. Lightfoot represents a change of this judicial standard
to the legislation's "actual effect." 40 The dilemma created by applying the
"actual effect" test lies in cases where the legislative purpose is constitu-
tional, but an effect of the legislation is especially adverse to certain groups
and appears to be a denial of constitutional guarantees. If the Supreme
Court employes the "actual effect" test, they would have to rule the legisla-
tion violative of the Constitution, whereas if the test is "legislative purpose,"
it will be constitutional. 41
In a concurring opinion, Justice Whittaker states that even though the
Alabama Legislature's purpose is the exclusion of Negro voters from Tuskegee
elections, no violation of the fifteenth amendment exists because they were
not totally disfranchised and could still vote in county, state and national
elections. 42 The weight of authority, as well as the explicit language of the
fifteenth amendment, is against this rationale. The amendment restricts the
power of the national and state government and applies to all elections.
Thus, it is an untenable view that Justice Whittaker takes when he declares
racial discrimination in a local election (when the Negro can vote elsewhere)
is outside the scope of the fifteenth amendment.
The majority opinion in Gomillion v. Lightfoot is based entirely on the
provisions of the fifteenth amendment. As a result, the Supreme Court
37 Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 29 U.S.L.
Week 3154 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1960).
38 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra note 2.
39 Guinn v. United States, supra note 14; Vick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) ; See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) where the Court said,
"all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are suspect.
That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Recent cases where "legislative purpose"
was the judicial standard: Shelton v. Tucker, 81 Sup. Ct. 247 (1960); Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
40 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra note 2, at 341.
41 A hypothetical case will illustrate this point. A certain sector of Tuskegee
becomes a financial burden to the city, and as a result it is forced into near bank-
ruptcy. The legislature enacts a law which alters the city boundaries to exclude this
area. One "actual effect" of the legislation is the denial to a large number of Negro
voters the right to vote in Tuskegee because they live in the area causing the monetary
burden. If the Court relies on the effect test, this enactment would be unconstitutional.
However, the "legislative purpose" (avoiding a financial crisis in Tuskegee) does not
violate any constitutional guarantees.
42 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra note 2, at 349.
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ignored the obvious fourteenth amendment violation inherent in the re-
districting act. The fourteenth amendment was passed with special intent
to protect Negroes from discrimination. 43 Its scope is summarized in a
leading case which declares, "... the Amendment was primarily designed
that no discrimination shall be made against the Negro by law because of
their color." 44 In light of the amendment's intent, it is difficult to ascertain
why the Court failed to make it part of their analysis. The Supreme Court
might have discussed both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments in
Gomillion v. Ligktfoot.
43 Nixon v. Herndon, supra note 16.
44 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 77 (1917).
